Aristotle and Happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics

What is happiness, and what does it consist of? Here I provide an answer as to what Aristotle and Epicurus may have said.

Introduction

With just a little reflection, we each can reach the conclusion that happiness is the ultimate end at which we all aim. For happiness is the only good that we desire for its own sake, and it is for happiness that we desire all other ends (NE I.7.) However, this leaves several questions to be answered. Namely, what is happiness, and what does it consist of? Since the dawn of time, philosophers have been wrestling with this question. Some philosophers, such as Plato, maintained a eudaemonistic conception of happiness, holding that happiness is the highest good and that it is achieved through fulfillment of one’s social function and temperance concerning appetites. On the other hand, the Epicureans answered, almost deceptively, that happiness is pleasure; by eliminating unnecessary pain, namely the fear of death and punishment from the gods, one could live more pleasurably (Baltzy 2019). The Stoics, in contrast to the Eudaimonist, such as Aristotle, held virtue to be sufficient for happiness. They held the virtuous life to be one lived in accordance with nature, meaning that happiness is obtained by perfecting virtue and maintaining an indifference towards external goods (Baltzy 2019). 

Aristotle argued that while virtue was necessary for happiness, it wasn’t sufficient. For Aristotle, a combination of virtue and external and bodily goods is required for happiness: “All the same, it [virtue] apparently needs external goods to be added, as we said, since it is impossible or not easy to do noble actions without supplies. For just as we perform many actions by means of instruments, we perform many by means of friends, wealth, and political power” (NE I.8.) Throughout this essay, I will explore Aristotle’s understanding of happiness and discuss whether or not we can take his account to be analogous to hedonism. My research will be formatted in the following manner: In section I, I will provide an account of Aristotle’s conception of human flourishing as it developed throughout the Nicomachean Ethics; in section II, I will define hedonism before continuing to distinguish between its two primary forms, i.e., psychological and ethical hedonism; lastly, in section III, I will revisit the account of happiness provided by Aristotle in light of the discussion on hedonism to see what, if anything, the two ethical frameworks share.

I. Aristotle’s Conception of Human Flourishing

In his primary argument in his ethical treatise, Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that the ultimate good is happiness, and that this is attained when one fulfills the rational soul’s function of living virtuously. In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that every line of inquiry, decision, and action “seek some good,” and that there must be some ultimate good to which all other goods are oriented; that is to say that there must be a good which is complete and sought for its own sake, and not for the sake of something greater (NE I.1.) If we can discover what this good is to which we all aspire, we can equip ourselves with the necessary knowledge to aim toward this good  “like archers with a target,” as the Philosopher says (NE I.2.) After reflection on several things others claim to be the highest good, Aristotle argues that it must be happiness: “Happiness seems to be most like this, since we always choose because of itself and never because of something else. But honor, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue, though we do choose them because of themselves as well, we also choose for the sake of happiness, supposing that because of them we shall be happy” (NE I.7.)

Next, in order to avoid saying something as commonplace as “happiness is the best good,” and to help grasp what happiness consists of, Aristotle provides commentary on the function of a human being, for “just as a flute player, a sculptor, every craftsman, and in general for whatever has some function and action, the good—the doing well—seems to lie in the function, the same also seems to hold of a human being, if indeed there is some function that is his” (NE I.7.) First, he argues that our function must be more than growth, as we share that with plants, and that it must be more than perception, as we share this with the common ox; instead, he argues that we are differentiated from other life forms via the practical part of our soul which is able to obey reason. For that reason, the human function must be “activity of the soul in accord with reason,” and to live well must mean to reason “well and nobly” (NE.1.7.) Therefore, he reasons that by performing “activity of the soul in accord with virtue and, if there are more virtues than one, then in accord with the best and most complete,” happiness is attained (NE I.7)

So, if happiness is obtained through performing our function well, that is, the activity of the soul in accord with the best and most complete virtues, how does one live virtuously? Throughout the rest of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines the virtues, unpacks what it means to act virtuously, and how the cultivation of virtue results in happiness. In Book II, Aristotle distinguishes between two types of virtue: those that pertain to the rational part of the soul that involves reason, virtues of thought, and those that belong to the part of the soul that obeys reason, character virtues (NE II.1.) Aristotle maintains that the soul is divided into rational and irrational elements. The virtues belong to each accordingly; by growing in virtue, it is as if the nonrational part of the soul is learning to cooperate with the rational part. 

Virtues of character are those that one acquires through habit, thus informing Aristotle’s notion of habituated virtue. Virtues of thought, in contrast, are those that are developed as a result of teaching and experience. Neither of these virtues comes naturally, but can be obtained through habituation towards virtue: “The virtues, by contrast, we acquire first by engaging in the activities, as is also the case of the various crafts. For the things we cannot produce without learning to do so are the very ones we learn to produce by producing them—for example, we become builders by building houses and lyre players by playing the lyre” (NE II.1.) By performing repetition of virtuous, or corrupt, activities we become more virtuous or vile. For example, if someone “indulges in every pleasure and abstains from none” he would become intemperate. Still, if he were to indulge in little or none, he would be boorish. Therefore, cultivating virtue is about establishing a proper equilibrium. Concerted effort to form virtuous habits and study aids one in reaching this state. 

II. Defining Hedonism

Hedonism, being derived from the ancient Greek word “hedone,” meaning pleasure, is a term for a theory of ethics that asserts pleasure of one sort or another to be the criteria upon which all other judgments are to be made; e.g., discernment of the good, our choice of behavior, and the motivations we should maintain (Moore 2019.) Hedonistic theories have been professed since the earliest times in history. Misrepresentations of these theories have been around equally as long. These theories have been widely misunderstood and misrepresented by their critics, who mistakenly characterizing the pleasure the Hedonist describe to be wholly physical. Fortunately for the Hedonists, this is a mere perversion of their ethical framework. Nearly all theories of hedonism have recognized the transitory nature of most physical pleasures and the prerequisite of pain, which must be involved if one is to experience such physical sensations; thus, physical pleasure has been held as a lesser pleasure amongst the hedonist due to it temporality (O’Keefe 2016.) Instead, the pleasure derived from honor, reputation, friendship, knowledge, and, most importantly, comfortable states in which fear is absent, is recognized to be preferable (O’Keefe 2016.)

The misrepresentation offered by critics of hedonism is most attributable to the earliest and most extreme form of hedonism described by the Cyrenaics (Moore 2019.) The Cyrenaics, like all other hedonists, argued that pleasure was the highest good, but they took the argument further by claiming the good life to consist of rational manipulation of the moment with a pleasure-maximizing perspective to achieve maximal sensual pleasure at all times (Moore 2019.) The most dominant philosophical view of hedonism is not that declared by the Cyrenaics but rather that described by the Epicureans. Epicurus shared commonplace with Aristotle in holding happiness to be the highest good, but disagreed with Aristotle in identifying happiness with pleasure. For Epicurus, pleasure is the only thing that people value for its own sake; that is, everything we do, we do for the end of acquiring pleasure for ourselves (O’Keefe 2016.) Therefore, he maintained that if one were to attempt to live a life of maximal human flourishing, one would exercise self-restraint and forego immediate pleasures under the guidance of reason to aim at a life of enduring pleasure and minimal pain (O’Keefe 2016.)

Epicurus differentiated between two different types of pleasures to show what the happy life consists of: “moving” and “static” pleasures. “Moving” pleasures are those one experiences when satisfying a desire, such as drinking water. “Static” pleasures are those characterized by a state of satiety, such as after your thirst has been satisfied (O’Keefe 2016.) The latter is the best pleasure as it allows for one to be in a state of equilibrium, absent of need and fear. We can understand hedonism as a general term to describe all schools of thought in which the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain is claimed to be the primary aim of man. I will briefly describe the two schools of hedonistic thought moving forward with this definition. Differentiating between these two categories will help us determine if Aristotle can be said to be a hedonist. 

a. Psychological Hedonism

Philosophers commonly observe two different types of hedonism: psychological and ethical hedonism. Psychological hedonism asserts that the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain is our sole means of motivation (Moore 2019.) That is to say that each and every one of our actions is determined by pleasure or pain. The theory of psychological hedonism maintains that altruism is impossible as one is motivated not by selfless concern for the well-being of others but rather for the fulfillment of their desires, whether consciously or unconsciously, which brings pleasure. Well, what about the case of a seemingly self-sacrificing parent who works an excessive number of hours a week to ensure their child is well-fed and clothed, one might ask. Using this theory, the parent would be doing this in pursuit of the pride that comes from being responsible and a good parent and not for the child. Psychological hedonism holds that we are focused on maximizing what we perceive to be our good and that we accept our good to be a sufficient level of pleasure and minimal pain (Moore 2019.) By doing this, we fulfill our role and flourish as beings. Hence, being distinctive from the normative hedonism proclaimed by the Cyrenaics, which held pleasure to be the only thing intrinsically valuable, and ethical hedonism, which we will explore next. 

b. Ethical Hedonism

Ethical hedonism maintains that our fundamental moral obligation is to maximize pleasure or happiness and minimize pain. For the ethical hedonists, only pleasure has positive importance, and only displeasure has negative importance (Moore 2019.) Therefore, what one must do to live a flourishing life is obvious: he must live a life where the maximal amount of pleasure is obtained. Epicurus, whom ethical hedonism is often associated with, wrote in A Letter to Menoeceu, “We recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good” (O’Keefe 2016.) Other things that may come by way of our pursuit of pleasure, such as art, friendship, knowledge, virtues, etc., are instruments for our desired nature and have little value outside their status as instruments. Epicurean and later Christian philosophers, such as Thomas More, would argue that by pursuing more naturally grounded pleasures with a long-term pleasurable state in mind, one would maintain a state of happiness (O’Keefe 2016.)

III. Aristotle and Hedonism

The fundamental difference between Aristotle’s ethics and those of the hedonist is one of ends. The hedonists maintain happiness and pleasure to be equivalent to one another and therefore share the status as the highest good. Aristotle maintains that pleasure is a good, but not thie highest. Instead, happiness occupies this role.

 In Book X, Aristotle discusses the topic of pleasure as it seems to be both a subject of great significance and one of much dispute:  “For some say that pleasure is the good, whereas others, on the contrary, say that it is altogether bad” (NE X.1.) Aristotle understands people’s attitudes towards pleasure and pains to be significant for cultivating virtue, and therefore, he knows he must not omit this topic. He first begins his analysis of pleasure by visiting the commentary of a contemporary of his, Eudoxus, who held pleasure to be the highest good. Eudoxus argued that since all rational and irrational living beings pursued pleasure and sought to avoid pain, it must be the highest good  (NE X.2.) Aristotle agreed with Eudoxus in his belief that pleasure was choice worthy in and of itself, but disagreed that it was the ultimate good to which we all aspire. To justify this, Aristotle used a flaw in Eudoxus’ argument to show an insufficiency in the claim that pleasure alone is the highest good. Eudoxus argued that when another good is added to pleasure, it makes your state of being even better. However, this wouldn’t work for an ultimate good as the good itself is the highest thing attainable. Plato made a similar argument claiming that pleasure combined with prudence makes for the highest good, but it suffers from the same flaw as Eudoxus’ argument: an ultimate good can’t be made better. 

His argument against the claims of Eudoxus and Plato is by no means an endorsement of Puritan-like self-restraint. Nearly on the contrary. Aristotle holds pleasure to be a universal good that is a useful tool for habituating one to virtue, given proper association. Those who abstain from pleasures are no better than those indulge, for they are but tools for those who wish for others to act more justly. Some things people consider to be pleasurable, Aristotle argues, are in fact not pleasures but distortions by base beings: “For if they are pleasant to people in a bad condition, we should not think that they are pleasant, except to these people, any more than…things are white that appear so to people with an eye disease”  (NE X.3.) But his argument remains that pleasure is not the highest good, for there are things we would “consider excellent” even if they weren’t pleasurable; namely “seeing, remembering, knowing, and possessing the virtues” (NE X.3.) 

Aristotle also maintains that pleasure can not be the ultimate good due there abilities to compete with one another. For an example of this, he brings up an analogy of competing pleasures at a concert: “For lovers of flute music are incapable of paying attention to a discussion if they happen to overhear someone playing the flute, since they enjoy the flute more than the activity at hand. So the pleasure connected with flute playing ruins the activity [pleasure] related to a discussion” (NE X.5.) The best and most complete good must improve activities, not distract from them. Happiness does this by putting one in a state that pleasure does not. 

Happiness, according to Aristotle, is a self-sufficient activity and is desirable in and of itself. Virtuous people do not live their lives in a state of constant desire and distraction as even the most wicked people do this.  Therefore, for Aristotle, happiness is not mere pleasure as it is held to the by the hedonists. Happiness instead consists of the best part of man: his rational soul. What man shares with the divine is not his flesh but rather his ability to understand. Aristotle thus maintains that the contemplative life allows us to come to know existence is most preferable as it fulfills our function best as a species (NE X.7.) Since the contemplative life is most proper to man, it is also the best and most pleasant as it lets us share with the divine in two things: understanding and immortality. To be happy is not to be in a pleasurable state, but rather to exercise activity in accord with wisdom. 

Conclusion

In the closing chapters of Book X, Aristotle urges the readers of his treatise to apply the principles he discusses to their own lives to see if they will fulfill their function. The wise person lives most like the gods and will thus draw their favor as his way of living offers glorification to them: “The person whose activity is in accord with understanding, however and who takes care of it, would seem both to be in the best condition and the one most loved by the gods” (NE X.8.) Understanding is the most god-like activity, so understanding your function and doing it well is certain to bring about that to which we each aim: i.e. happiness. By reaching happiness through the cultivation of virtue and maintaining it through studying, we each can fulfill our function well and thus be fulfilled. 

Bibliography

Aristotle. (2014). Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Co., Inc.

Moore, A. (2019). Hedonism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/hedonism/

Baltzy, D. (2019). Stoicism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/stoicism/

O’Keefe, T. (2016). Epicurus. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://iep.utm.edu/epicur/